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I. INTRODUCTION
It took two years on the legislative battlefield for Congress and
President Bush to arrive at an acceptable compromise.' But after
lengthy discussions on the appropriate format for the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,2 ironically the result was an Act with numerous loose ends to
tie.
With so many legal questions left open and the stakes being so
high, the Act is begging for attention, and the courts are left with sev-
* Associate, Behrens & Tate, P.C.
1. The compromise was labeled a "classic legislative deal" by Stuart Taylor of Amer-
ican Lawyer Magazine. Both liberal democrats and conservatives gave ground to
arrive at a deal but left the real differences and the most difficult policy decisions
unresolved. MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 1991, at 36.
2. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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eral tangled issues in their laps. There is little doubt it will take
longer than the two years Congress spent enacting the legislation to
straighten it all out.
Of all the questions the Act raises, there is one receiving the most
attention:3 Whether and to what extent the Act should apply retroac-
3. There are two other major questions left by the Act which will not be addressed
in this comment: The first is the determination of the present "disparate im-
pact" doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1)(A)(West Supp. 1992). The doctrine
provides that if an employer has a screening criteria that disproportionately dis-
qualifies workers of a protected group, the employer may violate Title VII even
without any specific discriminatory motive.
The disparate impact doctrine was created in the 1971 Supreme Court case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), became established through the
years, and then was weakened in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989). In Griggs, the Court stated: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimi-
nation, but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
"But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply motivation." Griggs v. Dr. KePower Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32
(1971).
Essentially Griggs created two steps: First, the employee or applicant for em-
ployment carries the burden to demonstrate that the employer practice has the
impact of denying opportunities to a protected class. Second, if the adverse im-
pact is shown, the employer has the burden of showing that the practice serves
some "business necessity," evaluated on whether the practice is closely related to
the employee's ability to perform a particular job. IM at 432. A third step allowed
a plaintiff to overcome the business necessity defense if the plaintiff could show
that the employer could have created a less discriminatory alternative.
Wards Cove stated that, when considering whether an alternative to the pres-
ent employer's practice is as effective as the challenged practice, the cost and
other burdens of effectuating the proposed alternative are relevant in determin-
ing if the alternative would be as effective as the challenged practice in serving
the employer's goals. In addition, Wards Cove stressed that the judiciary must
exercise caution before requiring an employer to adopt an alternative practice for
hiring employees.
The Act attempts to reinstate much of the disparate impact doctrine as it ex-
isted prior to Wards Cove. The legislation produces a notable change in the doc-
trine by taking what was a court based rule and giving it legislative authority.
But, in one of its most ambiguous provisions, the Act requires the less discrimina-
tory alternative procedure to be evaluated "in accordance with the law as it ex-
isted on June 4, 1989," ie. the day prior to the Wards Cove decision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(c)(West Supp. 1992). However, it is not clear if the provision ad-
dresses the question of which party has the burden of proposing the alternative or
merely was intended to address the decision in Wards Cove.
The second major question is the scope of new damages under Title VII.
Under the former Title VII, a person within a protected class was not entitled to
compensatory and punitive damages. Under the new Act, a victim of discrimina-
tion has the ability to collect compensatory and punitive damages, but only if the
party "cannot recover" under Section 1981 and if the respondent engaged in un-
lawful "intentional discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)(West Supp. 1992).
Disallowing the complaining party the ability to recover under Section 1981
could be taken to mean that, if the party is statutorily eligible to pursue under
Section 1981, damages can not be sought under Title VII. Alternately, the provi-
sion could also be read to allow a discriminatee to pursue Title VII damages even
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tively?4 Considering the grant of punitive and compensatory damages
under the Act, the issue of whether or not the Act applies to discrimi-
natory actions that took place prior to passage of the Act is the "single
most important question about the legislation." 5 The face of every Ti-
tle VII suit presently being litigated, negotiated or discussed, in which
the discriminatory act occurred prior to November 21, 1991, could be
changed.
This Comment will discuss how and when federal civil laws are
applied retroactively, the proper mode of interpretation as set out by
the Supreme Court and how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be
interpreted with regard to the issue of retroactivity.
H. DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVITY OF LEGISLATION
Law provides important background norms for many, if not most
decisions. We depend on the present state of the law to provide the
groundwork to form contracts, buy and sell real estate, file bank-
ruptcy, have valid marriages or determine the amount we owe in
taxes.
Our dependance is even greater after our actions are complete be-
cause our ability to mold our actions is restricted. Changing the laws
of yesterday could invalidate the lease we have on an apartment,
change what we owed in taxes, make us liable for debt disposed of in
if a recovery could have occurred under Section 1981 but the person failed to
meet the statute of limitations.
4. Reginald Jones, a top staff aide on the Senate Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee, in a breakfast briefing for business persons, told the audience that the
ambiguities on the issue of retroactivity were based on the inability to strike a
deal. The moderate republicans who took the lead in drafting the Senate bill
intended for damages to apply prospectively only, however, explicit language may
have lost them the majority needed to pass the bill. Mr. Jones said: "You have to
decide if there are votes there to support this type of enactment, and we didn't
have the votes on the left.... The deal was cut to make the (language of the)
statute fairly clear and then leave it to the courts to pound out the issue." Dis-
pute Over Retroactivity of Civil Rights Act Stems From Legislative History, Hill
Staffer Says, 14 DAMIY LAB. REP. A-13, (1992).
5. Ambiguities in Civil Rights Law Must Still Be Resolved by Courts, 238 DAILY
LAB. REP. C-1 (1991). According to EEOC records, there were about 850 cases of
employment discrimination pending in the courts and more than 60,000 before
the EEOC when the bill became law. Dispute Over Retroactivity of Civil Rights
Act Stems From Legislative History, Hill Staffer Says, 14 DAILY LAB. REP. A-13
(1992). In addition, the retroactivity issue involves millions of dollars to employ-
ers and employees. Compensatory damage may be sought from an employer "for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.... Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(West Supp. 1992). Punitive damages may be
received "if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1)(West Supp. 1992).
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bankruptcy or subject us to liabilities for what were, at the time, legal
actions.6
Limiting how laws apply to completed actions is a cornerstone to
free flowing commerce and one would expect the standard to be clear.
However, the exact scope and effect of constructing these limits is the
subject of debate and confusion.7 The arena for the debate is not con-
stitutional but one of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court
has provided very little constitutional footing for challenging Congres-
sional ability to pass and enforce retroactive legislation. Virtually the
only claim the Court has examined is one based on the right to due
process.8 In spite of the Court's attention, the Court is quite unlikely
to question a retroactive statute based on due process.9 This is because
the Court applies the minimum level of scrutiny-whether or not the
legislation is arbitrary-to determine the validity of the retroactive
legislation.
A. Retroactivity and Bradley
The entire focus of the courts-to determine the retroactivity of
civil legislation-is on the construction and interpretation of the stat-
ute itself. In this area, the Supreme Court has spoke from both sides
of its mouth. No single test exists by which one can decide when, how
and whether or not legislation is purely prospective. The result is un-
predictability and confusion.
The decision that has been given the primary responsibility for the
controversy is Bradley v. School Board.1o Bradley dealt with a suit
filed by eleven parents whose children were of African American de-
6. "The common law upholds the principle that the citizenry should be able to make
everyday decisions with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences of their
actions. This principle is based on fundamental notions of fairness and justice. It
is well established, however, that the legislature may enact a statute to have ret-
roactive effect. Consistent with the common law antipathy, courts traditionally
interpret statutes to apply prospectively absent clear indication of legislative in-
tent to the contrary." Gene A. Maguire, Comment, Retroactive Application of
Statutes: Protection of Reliance Interests, 40 MAINE L. REV. 183 (1988)(footnotes
omitted).
7. Criminal statutes-unlike civil statutes-are subject to U.S. Const. art. I § 10
which disallows any ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law is one which renders
an act punishable or subject to a greater punishment than when committed.
8. See, Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. See also, General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S.Ct. 1105 (1992), for a decision in
which the Supreme Court strikes down an argument made that a retroactive stat-
ute violates the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
10. 416 U.S. 696 (1974); See Hilde E. Kahn, Completed Acts, Pending Cases, and Con-
flicting Presumptions: The Retroactive Application of Legislation After Bradley,
13 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1990). While Thorpe was the first case setting
forth the presumption of retroactivity .... Bradley expounded on its supposed
precedential basis in great detail. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827, 851 (1990)(Scalia, J., concurring).
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scent against the School Board of Richmond, Virginia. The parents
sought desegregation of the public schools based on the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.11
After several years in the court system, the parents appealed the
case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the issue of whether
they should be entitled to attorney's fees from the School Board. Af-
ter the issue was submitted to the Court of Appeals, but prior to the
court's decision, the Education Amendments of 1972 were passed by
Congress. That Act granted federal courts the authority to award rea-
sonable attorney's fees in school desegregation cases.1 2 The Appellate
Court denied the fee claim, the parents appealed, and the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case.
Granting the fees, the Court in Bradley held, "[A] court is to apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so
would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or leg-
islative history to the contrary."13 Finding no manifest injustice or
statutory direction, the Court applied the new fees provision to a situa-
tion that began thirteen years earlier.14
Bradley appears to set out a rule favoring the retroactive applica-
tion of laws unless special circumstances exist or the legislation specif-
ically provides for only prospective application.15 The reason Bradley
only gives "the appearance" of creating a presumption of retroactivity,
is the plethora of decisions prior to and following Bradley in direct
contradiction.16
During all the 19th and 20th century--except for the Bradley pre-
sumption-the Supreme Court applied the consistent principle that
legislation is restricted to prospective application unless there is a spe-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-561, tit. VI, § 601(b)(2), 92 Stat. 2268
(1978).
13. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
14. Id. at 724.
15. The Court decided that no manifest injustice occurred because there was no in-
creased burden imposed on the School Board to provide nondiscriminatory educa-
tion. Since the Board knew there was a chance legal fees could be rendered
under other theories, the Court analogized, the statute merely served to create an
additional basis for the Board's liability of attorney's fees. "It does not impose an
additional or unforeseeable obligation upon it." Id. at 721. The author would ar-
gue that this lacks merit. Under the American system of justice, the opportuni-
ties for receiving attorney's fees are rare at best absent a statute to provide them.
Thus any grant of fees when the defendant had a very reasonable expectation for
none to be granted amounts to the change of a very substantial obligation by the
School Board.
16. Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), attempts to rationalize the decisions as to how they
may in fact be part of one rule. In the end, however, Justice Scalia calls for Brad-
ley to be overturned and for a consistent rule of law.
1992]
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cific statement by Congress otherwise.17 This principle, repeated since
the 1800's, goes as follows:
[T]he first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as ad-
dressed to the future, not to the past .... The rule has been expressed in
varying degrees of strength but always of one import, that a retrospective op-
eration will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights
... unless such be 'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature.'
1 8
The Supreme Court has yet to explain an appropriate method to
rationalize the contradictory line of cases. Yet, in the majority of the
decisions discussing the issue, the Court has reaffirmed the generally
accepted axiom that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law . . .
[and][C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result."19
One of the most recent cases reaffirming this principle is Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp.20 In 1981, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services issued a cost-limit schedule, including changes in the
way cost limits were calculated. These cost limits were used to set
limits on the amount of medicare costs reimbursed to caregivers such
as hospitals.21 One of the changes was to the "wage index," a method
used to demonstrate the appropriate salaries of employees in various
parts of the country. Before the change, the wage index was calcu-
lated by averaging the salaries for all hospitals in an area. Under the
new rule, wages paid by federal government hospitals were excluded
from that computation.2 2
These changes were issued in 1981. In 1983, the 1981 wage-index
rule was struck down for failing to comply with the Administrative
17. The first case is United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806), which
states: "Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless
they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed
to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied."
18. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982)(citing Union Pa-
cific R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913). See, e.g., Kahn,
supra note 9, at 233 n.12, for a list of cases endorsing the principle.
19. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (citing Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, (1988).
20. 488 U.S. 204 (1988). Bowen could be distinguished as presenting a different set of
issues since it relates to the presumption and the actions of regulatory agencies
rather than a presumption for acts themselves. In fact, Congress or the courts
may prefer a system that limits an agencies ability to issue retroactive regulations
and thus subscribe to a separate set of rules. However, to date this has not been
the case and the courts have interpreted agency actions in the same manner and
using the same precedent as they have for interpreting Congressional acts.
21. Under the Medicare program, health care providers are reimbursed by the Fed-
eral government for the expenses they incur providing medical services to medi-
care beneficiaries. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
22. 46 Fed. Reg. 33,637, 33,639 (1981).
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Procedures Act.23 The Secretary recognized the invalidity of the 1981
index and reimbursed hospitals by applying the prior wage-index.24
In 1984, the Secretary again proceeded to institute the 1981 wage-
index, this time complying with the Administrative Procedures Act.25
Under the Secretary's rule, the index was to take effect retroactively
as of July 1, 1981.26 The net result was that the Secretary was able to
collect those sums previously paid, and the hospitals would sit in a
position as if the 1981 wage-index rule was never set aside. Hospitals
that were required to reimburse the federal government for money
they had been paid, sought judicial review of the Secretary's action.27
An agency's power to proscribe retroactive regulations is deter-
mined by whether the power is provided in the appropriate legislation
granting the agency its authority.28 The Secretary claimed to have the
power by; 1) the grant to make regulations to provide for making suit-
able retroactive corrective adjustments,29 and 2) the general grant of
authority to create cost limit rules.3 0
The Court, however, rejected the Secretary's contentions and
found no authority. The Court focused exclusively on the fact that no
statutory or legislative intent existed to grant the Secretary retroac-
tive powers.3 ' Thus, without retroactivity being expressly authorized,
23. 5 U.S.C. § 551 to 576 (1988).
24. See 49 Fed. Reg. 6175 (1984).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 551 to 578 (1984).
26. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,495 (1984).
27. A group of seven hospitals who had to turn a total of two million dollars in reim-
bursement payments, sought judicial remedies claiming the retroactive applica-
tion was invalid under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
28. The Court stated-
Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus congressional enactments
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result. E.g., Greene v. United States,
376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. V. Commissioner, 323
U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Miller V. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935);
United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-163 (1928).
By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking au-
thority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by
Congress in express terms.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
29. Id at 209. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii)(1988) states, "Such regu-
lations shall ... (ii) provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective ad-
justments where, for a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate
reimbursement produced by the methods of determining costs proves to be inade-
quate or excessive."
30. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A), 1395hh, 1395ii (1988).
31. The Court reasoned that although § 1395x(v)(1)(A) on its face permits some ret-
roactive action, the language of the statute only applied to a case by case situation
and not the ability to produce overall retroactive rulemaking. Bowen v. Ge-
orgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 209 (1988).
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the regulation must apply prospectively. 32
Despite this reaffirmation of the presumption against retroactivity,
the Court refused to rationalize the two lines of cases or to provide a
single consistent rule.3 3 Instead, the Court left the conflicting cases
intact.
B. The Proper Determination of Retroactivity
So, with what appears to be two precedential lines of authority in
direct contradiction to each other, on what basis do we determine
whether legislation should be deemed retroactive? The answer is that
there are two essential steps to the analysis. The first looks exclu-
sively at the intent of Congress found in either the legislation itself
(preferably) or within the legislative history. If an intent exists, it
rules. If no pronounced intent exists, step two must be utilized.
Step two is where the confusion from the Bradley presumption
takes place, and thus is not as straightforward as step one. Since the
Court has yet to thoroughly define step two, it is largely speculative.
From the speculation, several theories have arisen. The author's the-
ory proposes that the Bradley presumption is dead and as long as legis-
lation lacks intent, it will not apply retroactively.
An alternative theory suggests the Bradley presumption exists
only when new legislation is enacted during the adjudication. But, a
non-retroactive presumption exists if the legislation is enacted after
the act but prior to adjudication.
A third approach would divide legislation into substantive and pro-
cedural changes. Without legislative direction, any substantive change
would apply prospectively only, whereas procedural changes would
apply to all cases.
1. Intent of the Legislation
The primary source for determining legislation's application is
within legislation itself. Legislation will often have dates of enact-
ment or lay out a specific intention as to the legislation's scope, and
when it does, it governs.3 4 As the Court in Kaiser Aluminum &
32. Id. at 213.
33. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990), the
Court noted that a tension exists between the two lines of authority but refused
to reconcile the clashing precedent. Under both the Bradley presumption and the
presumption against retroactivity, Congressional intent governs. Since the Court
is usually able to detect the intent, rectifying the rules is usually avoided.
34. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837
(1990),("[T]he plain language of both the original and amended versions of § 1961
evidence clear congressional intent that amended § 1961 is not applicable to judg-
ments entered before its effective date."). See also Bennett v. New Jersey, 470
U.S. 632, 641 (1984)("[B]oth the general purpose of the 1978 Amendments and the
[Vol. 71:879
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Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno noted, if the intent is clear, there is no
need to reconcile the two lines of precedent.35 Both Bradley and Ge-
orgetown (the most recent decision representing the presumption
against retroactivity) agree on this principle.3 6
2. Determining Retroactivity without Intent
a. The Fallacy of Bradley
The presumption Bradley creates is essentially bad law, both from
a legal analysis and sound policy standpoint. Without the Bradley pre-
sumption, a consistent rule based solely on intent is applied.
While most of the blame for the current confusion on whether leg-
islation should have a presumption of retroactivity or non-retroactiv-
ity is focused on Bradley,3 7 the confusion began with Thorpe v.
Housing Authority.38 Thorpe dealt with the eviction of a tenant from
low income, city operated housing in Durham, North Carolina. The
tenant was involved in organizing a tenants' association, and alleged
she was being evicted for her involvement. While the case was pend-
ing in front of the Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development issued a circular. The rule required that, prior to
eviction, local housing authorities should inform the tenant of the rea-
son for the action.3 9
The Court found the regulation applied retroactively to invalidate
the eviction which occurred eighteen months prior to the circular's
promulgation.4 0 The "general rule," the Court stated, was that a court
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.41 In
more specific references in the statute and legislative history suggest that the
new requirements were intended to apply prospectively").
35. 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990).
36. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 716-17 (1974)(intervening statute applied
retroactively unless a contrary intention appears); Bowen v. Georgetown Univer-
sity Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988)(statute does not apply retroactively unless it
language requires it). For the most part, establishing intent is a fairly simple and
repetitive process when drafting and passing legislation. For example, when you
look at Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, you find that it
becomes effective two years from the date it was enacted-July 26, 1992. Any
actions occurring before that date are not judged under the Act, whereas any
action following that date is subject to any restrictions Title I provides. 42
U.S.C.A. § 12101 (Crim. Supp. 1992).
37. 410 U.S. 696 (1974).
38. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
39. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 272 (1969)(see Footnote 8 for the text
of the circular).
40. Id. at 281.
41. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969). Thorpe is highly criticized
by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990). Justice Scalia notes the improper basis for
the Thorpe decision and how it snowballed into a larger misconception of law in
Bradley.
1992]
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creating this "general rule," Thorpe failed to mention the presumption
against retroactive application. Nor did the Court in Thorpe mention
any of the cases which cite the rule. Thus, one wonders where the
court derived such a "general rule" after close to 200 years of the com-
plete opposite approach? The answer is not impressive.
Thorpe was concerned with the situation where the law changes
between a decision made at a trial court and on appeal. 42 Thus, the
Court cited cases in which that situation existed. The first, was
United States v. Schooner Peggy43 and it was from Schooner Peggy the
Court appeared to derive its "general rule" favoring retroactivity.
In Schooner Peggy, the Court was faced with the interpretation of a
explicitly retroactive convention between the United States and
France entered into while the case was on appeal to the Supreme
Court. In its holding, the Court stated: "[I]f, subsequent to the judg-
ment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes
and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be
obeyed.... ,,44
In other words, if the law is positively changed, that is, produced to
apply retroactively, then the court should apply the law that exists at
the time of its decision. This interpretation is especially evident in
light of the Court's discussion which continues: "[A] court will and
ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retro-
spective operation, affect the rights of parties. .... 45
Thorpe erroneously took the presumption against retroactivity
noted in Schooner Peggy dicta and turned the presumption one hun-
dred and eighty degrees granting itself the authority to create the op-
42. Thorpe v. Housing Authority 393 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1969).
43. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801). In Schooner Peggy, a French vessel was seized by an
American ship and subject to condemnation. The Circuit Court held that the
vessel was on the high seas and as such was lawful prize for the American ship.
While the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, a convention was entered
into between the U.S. and France which restored all property "captured, and not
yet definitely condemned." Id. at 107. The Supreme Court held that the vessel
was not yet definitely condemned as under the convention and restored the prop-
erty. 1I at 108.
44. Id. at 110.
45. Id. at 110. The Court in Schooner Peggy also appeared more concerned with the
international and political aspects of the decision they were making rather than
applying the appropriate rule when it stated:
It is true, that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and
ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by retrospective
operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns,
where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national pur-
poses, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a con-
struction conforming to it manifest import; and if the nation has given up
the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the govern-
ment, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation.
[Vol. 71:879
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posite presumption. In this single stumble of stride, the Court' grand
interpretation turned into poor precedent.46
In addition to Schooner Peggy, Thorpe relied on three other cases
to demonstrate the presumption of retroactivity. In all three, the
Court applied the law at hand. The cases would appear to follow the
presumption of retroactivity, but upon a closer look, in none was the
standard rule against retroactivity actually applicable. All three were
grossly misinterpreted and improperly cited as supporting the pre-
sumption in favor of retroactive application of civil legislation.47
The first, Vandenbark v. Owens-llinois Glass Co.,48 gave retroac-
tive effect to a judicial decision, not legislation. That judicial decisions
apply retroactively, while legislation does not, is a universally ap-
proved rule of law; even the Court has recognized that to substitute
the precedent of one to determine another is illogical.49
The second and third, Carpenter v. Wabash Ry.50 and United States
v. Chambers,51 were just as irrelevant. Carpenter gave retroactive ef-
fect to a statute which specifically required it to be applied so, and
Chambers involved a criminal statute. Neither established a prece-
dent or basis from which Thorpe could create a presumption favoring
retroactivity.52
46. "Of course," says Justice Scalia, "it [Schooner Peggy] does not stand for that at
all--or at least not in the sense that Thorpe implied. It stands for the proposition
that when Congress plainly says-contrary to the ordinary presumption which
courts will 'struggle hard' to apply-that current law rather than the pre-existing
law governs the rights of parties, then courts 'must apply' that current law." Kai-
ser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 846-47 (1990)(Scalia,
J., concurring).
47. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969).
48. 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
49. See United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982), which states,
"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions
operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student."
50. 309 U.S. 23 (1940).
51. 291 U.S. 217 (1934).
52. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 849-50
(1991)(Scalia, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia writes that, none
of the cases relied upon by Bradley or Thorpe,
is genuinely contrary to that generally applied presumption. They con-
sist entirely of cases that involved retroactivity of judicial decisions
rather than statutes; cases in which the statute specifically provided for
retroactive application; cases that involved prospective rather than retro-
spective application, because they sought injunctive relief, because the
issue was a permit for future action or because the issue was whether the
United States' declaration of war made it appropriate for the trial court
to continue with proceedings; a case remanding to state court for its de-
termination of the effect of a newly enacted state statute and a case in-
volving the special rule applicable ... to repeal of a criminal sanction.
It is significant that not a single one of the earlier cases cited in
Thorpe and Bradley... even purports to be applying a presumption of
retroactivity.
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It seems significant that the Thorpe-Bradley presumption is cre-
ated from earlier cases, none of which "even purports to be applying a
presumption of retroactivity."53 Thus, the Thorpe-Bradley presump-
tion is based on a fallacy-on a gross misinterpretation that has per-
petuated itself into law. As long as the Thorpe-Bradley presumption
continues to linger on, legislative bodies, lawyers and courts alike have
no consistent basis to determine a piece of legislation's retroactivity.54
b. Timing of an Act's Passage
If the Thorpe-Bradley presumption continues to exist, it is difficult
to determine how it should be applied along side the opposite prece-
dent. Bradley suggests all decisions must apply current law no matter
when the change occurred. But, if there exists a consistent feature
among cases applying the Thorpe-Bradley presumption, it is that those
cases involve a change in the law after the initial adjudication of the
case. Likewise, those cases in which the law changed after the party's
conduct, but prior to the adjudication, did not apply the new legisla-
tion but applied the law that existed at the time of the conduct.55
In this light, the Thorpe-Bradley presumption may not be an over-
all general rule applying to all legislation, but a special rule applied
only when the parties' obligations under the law have been previously
litigated, and new legislation readjusting their legal relationships oc-
curs. It seems quite odd, however, to apply new legislation to previ-
ously adjudicated cases when, at the same time, the obligations of
parties not yet adjudicated must rely on the former legislation.
The opposite would appear more logical. If we were to apply new
legislation to prior conduct which has yet to be adjudicated, the expec-
tation of the parties would be destroyed, but at least those obligations
would not have been formally determined in court. Then, to provide
parties who have received protection through adjudication the benefit
of nonretroactivity, would bring a more just result.
Such a rule, with only a moment's thought, demonstrates its own
irrationality. No court has formally pursued a rule which would over-
turn adjudicated cases and let unadjudicated ones stand in light of new
legislation. But it is upon these lines one can find the similarity of the
Court's prior decisions. Likewise, no court is likely to pursue such an
illogical rule in the future.
Id.
53. Id. at 850.
54. Justice Scalia suggests "We [the Supreme Court] should turn this frog [the
Thorpe-Bradley presumption] back to a prince as soon as possible."- Id. at 857.
55. See Kaiser, 494 U.S. 827, 851 (1990)(Scalia, J., concurring).
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c. Substantive v. Procedural
One author has proposed yet another method to apply step two of
the retroactivity test. Hilde Kahn proposes that cases should be di-
vided between substantive and procedural changes.5 6 The theory goes
as follows: if a new statute is created or an existing one amended so
that a party's substantive obligations for a completed act are altered,
the court must not give the legislation retroactive effect without clear
intent. But if the change is purely procedural, such changes would
affect all parties whether the questioned activity was completed or
not.5
7
A statute has substantive effect, so the theory goes, if it creates and
destroys causes of action, liabilities, and substantive defenses. A stat-
ute is non-substantive if it merely affects the procedural aspects of liti-
gation or the extent and types of relief available.58 The problem lies
in the ability to distinguish between the two.
Every procedural change will result in a substantive one. A com-
mon definition used by courts to distinguish between the two is the
following: "In order for a statute to be considered remedial [non-sub-
stantive] it must be one that neither enlarges nor impairs substantive
rights but relates to the means and procedures for enforcement of
those rights."599 This test goes a long way in explaining how vague the
line is between procedural and substantive legislation. The test basi-
cally tells us that a statute is procedural if it is not substantive. With
such a test, what comes out of the courts are "I know it when I see it"
decisions, lack of uniformity and the inability for citizens to determine
the effect of their actions without litigation and the dreaded "case by
case" analysis.
Under the Act for example, certain time limits are extended. Is
that a procedural or substantive change? On the one hand it seems
merely procedural to change certain time periods by which complaints
need to be filed. On the other hand, a time limit change, if applied
retroactively, will not only change the procedure of any complaint but
may make a difference between creating an entire cause of action or
not providing one at all. Likewise, the Act allows jury trials to be used
for the first time in Title VII actions. Such a change would appear
procedural, but as any trial attorney knows, adding the element of a
jury can greatly increase the potentially available damages.
56. Kahn, supra note 9.
57. Id. at 245.
58. Id- at 246.
59. United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1381 (7th Cir.) cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1153
(1986); see aZso Griffon v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d
146, 153 (5th Cir. 1986) (retroactive application of a statute should not be applied if
it would either upset 'vested' rights or interfere with settled expectations that
guided on individuals conduct).
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It is true, many cases have attempted to limit the blow from Brad-
ley by applying its presumption to only procedural situations.60 The
most pronounced among them is the Supreme Court case of Bennett v.
New Jersey.61 In Bennett, New Jersey schools were receiving funds
from the Federal Government based on the number of impoverished
children within a school district.62 Based on the Act, any funds dis-
persed to the state and expended in violation of the Act could be re-
covered by the Federal Government. The Department of Education
calculated that New Jersey owed over one million dollars for improp-
erly spent funds from 1970 to 1972. The state argued that based on
1978 Amendments to Title 1,63 the funds were used properly-even
though misused during the years 1970 through 1972-because the 1978
amendments were retroactive and governed the early 1970's
expenditures.
The Court criticized the use of the Bradley presumption in in-
stances in which there are substantive changes made in the law.64 The
Court, in its decision, did not attempt to lay out a rule which distin-
guishes between procedural and substantive changes in civil law, nor
did the Court produce a clear line distinction between substantive and
procedural changes as Kahn interprets the opinion.
What the Court was up to in Bennett is uncertain. The Court could
be attempting to create a rule-as some lower courts have followed-
which distinguishes between substantive and procedural changes, but
the Bennett decision only suggests such an outcome and has not been
followed by the Court. The Court's suggestion from Bennett is not a
basis by which to establish a rule creating a substantive/procedural
distinction. Such a rule would only serve to reaffirm a portion of the
Thorpe-Bradley presumption which is without precedent.
d. The Death of Bradley
Despite all the theories to rationalize the Bradley presumption, the
60. See Delta Computer Corp. v. Samsung Semiconductor & Telecommunications
Co., 879 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1989); Turboff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 867 F.2d 1518, 1521 (5th Cir. 1989); French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d
295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981).
61. 470 U.S. 632 (1988).
62. §§ 241a, 241c(a)(2)(1976)(repealed by 1978).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 to 3367 (1978)(amended 1990).
64. The Court concluded, "that reliance on such a presumption in this context is in-
appropriate. Both the nature of the obligations that arose under the Title I pro-
gram and Bradley itself suggest that changes in substantive requirements for
federal grants should not be presumed to operate retroactively. Bennet v. New
Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 638 (1985). Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the pre-
sumption in Bradley should not be used to deprive a person of mature or uncondi-
tioned rights. This limitation comports with another venerable rule of statutory
interpretation, i.e., that statutes affecting substantive rights and liabilities are
presumed to have only prospective effect." Id. at 639.
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lingering of Bradley may no longer be a valid concern. The fragile
base on which Bradley stands is obvious and the Court appears cogni-
zant of this fact. The Court has given every indication it is merely a
matter of time before Bradley is formally overturned.
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,65 the Court
was faced with a statute which had a clear intent, thus, was never
faced with step two of determining retroactivity. As such, the Court
refused to reconcile the conflict between the non-retroactive presump-
tion and the Thorpe-Bradley presumption.66
However, the Court did discuss the building blocks of cases that led
to the Thorpe-Bradley presumption and impliedly criticized their hold-
ings. The Court describes the beginning of this house of cards as
Schooner Peggy,6 7 which set out a rule that "an amendment to the law
while a case was pending should be applied by the appellate court only
if, 'by its terms,' the law was to be applied to pending cases." 68 The
Court emphasizes the fact that Schooner Peggy did not create a pre-
sumption of retroactivity as the Thorpe and Bradley decisions gave
it.69 Instead, Schooner Peggy was consistent with the presumption
against retroactivity unless "by its terms" the law was to apply
retroactively.70
Justice Scalia, concurring in Kaiser, was not as subtle as the major-
ity. Justice Scalia urged the Court not to wait, but admit now that the
Thorpe-Bradley presumption was in error.71 Additionally, Justice
Scalia stated how doubtful it is that the Thorpe-Bradley presumption
continues to exist.72 The Court's criticism of this incorrect interpreta-
tion suggests the Court would-if given the opportunity-overturn the
Thorpe-Bradley presumption. The Court would be inconsistent at best
if it were to criticize the presumption in this method and later uphold
it.
65. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
66. "We need not in this case, however, reconcile the two lines of precedent... be-
cause under either view, where the congressional intent is clear, it governs." Id. at
837.
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
68. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-37 (1990).
69. Id. at 837.
70. The Court also notes the tension Bradley has with what has been a generally
accepted axiom that legislation will not have retroactive effect unless the lan-
guage of the statute requires it. Id.
71. Since the issue has been briefed and argued in this case, I would have
taken the occasion to admit that the rule we expressed in Thorpe and
Bradley was wrong, and to reaffirm the clear rule of construction that
has been applied, except for these last two decades of confusion, since
the beginning of the Republic and indeed since the early days of the com-
mon law: absent specific indication to the contrary, the operation of non-
penal legislation is prospective only.
Id at 841.
72. Id. at 854.
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Based on the Kaiser decision, the Thorpe-Bradley presumption is in
all likelihood deceased. The result is that all civil legislation should be
applied prospectively unless there exists explicit legislative intent to
do otherwise. The same rule applied for all of the 19th and 20th centu-
ries outside of Bradley.
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Whether or not the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied ret-
roactively is an issue that will, with little doubt, be before the
Supreme Court eventually.73 When the time comes, the determining
factor will be what presumption of retroactivity the Court applies.
Typically the Court is able to rely on the legislation itself to demon-
strate whether or not it is retroactive. If the answer is not found
there, then it can be found in the legislative intent. Thus, the Court is
rarely faced with having to apply a presumption either in favor of or
against retroactivity.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not provide the courts that con-
venience. The plain language and the legislative intent of the Act pro-
vide little guidance to the retroactive question. The materials divide
the issue, allowing any reasonable person to find valid support for or
against retroactivity.
This division appears to be just the way the bureaucrats who pre-
pared and passed the Act preferred it. Since the issue was divided
down political lines, each side decided that, rather than lose on the
issue, they would take their chances of winning in the courts. In the
end, neither side presents a more persuasive argument than the other,
and after all the pushing and shoving, the players are left muddy and
in midfield.
A. Purposes of the Act
The stated purposes of the Act are:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and un-
lawful harassment in the workplace;(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunci-
ated by the supreme court in Griggs V. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
and in the other supreme court decisions prior to Wards cove Packing Co. V.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and
73. To date, several cases addressing the issue of retroactivity have reached the ap-
pellate level. Parton v. G.T.E. North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1992); Wilson v.
Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1992); Langraf v. U.S.I. Film, 968 F.2d
427 (5th Cir. 1992); Luddington v. Indiana Bell, 966 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1992); Fray
v. Omaha; 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Vogel v. Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.
1992).
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(4) to respond to recent decisions of the supreme court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection
to victims of discrimination.7 4
A final purpose is to create additional remedies under Federal law to
deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace.75
The purpose lacks the sense of urgency about achieving the goals of
the Act one would expect to find in retroactive legislation. In fact, all
of the stated goals appear to be stated in the future, providing future
relief, future changes and future application rather than altering ex-
isting cases or the penalty for past acts.
More importantly, the Purpose section does not establish that cor-
recting prior adjudicated cases or applying the Act to completed acts is
one of the goals. Instead, purpose number four states the intention
was to "respond" to recent decisions by the Supreme Court, not alter
the rights of parties who had relied on those decisions in the past. If
Congress' desire was to create retroactive remedies, they could have
stated so by providing such a purpose. As an example, the first pur-
pose is "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace."7 6 Surely Congress
knows the difference between the present and the past. That purpose
would have read, "to provide additional remedies to prior determina-
tions and completed acts of intentional discrimination and unlawful
harassment in the workplace." However, Congress did not provide for
retroactive application in its goals, leading readers and interpreters to
believe it did not want to address completed actions.
B. Legislative Intent
Mark Twain once said, "There are two things you don't want to see
made close up: One is sausage, the other is legislation." This state-
ment is entirely true of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The process was
ugly, epitomizing the manipulation of the system for political gains.
Once the compromises were made on the appropriate language of the
statute, opponents and proponents of the retroactive issue came out of
the woodwork to explain the legislation's effect. In all, there were
four separate memoranda of interpretation which were designed to in-
fluence courts and practitioners. 77
74. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
75. Id § 2 (1).
76. Id. § 3.
77. Senator Danforth warned against relying to much on the legislative history:
It is very common for members of the Senate to try to affect the way in
which a court will interpret a statute by putting things into the Congres-
sional Record. Sometimes statements are made on the floor of the Sen-
ate. Sometimes the Senator will say, but for such and such a provision,
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1. Senator Kennedy-Representative Edwards
Senator Kennedy was the principal Democratic sponsor of the sub-
stitute language within the Act.78 Both Kennedy and Edwards were
of the opinion that the effective date of the Act should be governed by
Bradley v. School Board.79
Kennedy, as well as Edwards,8 0 sponsored the Bradley-Thorpe pre-
sumption in hopes of influencing courts to adopt their position. But
the mere statement that he prefers the Bradley approach does not
specify if the statute was intended to apply retroactively. This is a rec-
ognition by Kennedy, that the Act is not explicit on whether the Act
should apply retroactively. As such, Kennedy leaves the decision up
to the courts.8 '
2. Senator Danforth-Senator Dole Memorandum
Senator Danforth interprets the Act as not providing for retroac-
tive application. Like Senator Kennedy, Senator Danforth did not
look at the statute's language itself, but instead was making his inter-
pretation of the Bradley-Kaiser conflict.82 Senator Danforth how-
ever, supported the view discussed in the decisions of Bowen8 3 and
Kaiser 8 4 that legislation should not be applied retroactively without
explicit legislative intent.8 5
which I interpret in such and such a way, I never would support the bill.
This is one method of trying to doctor the legislative history and influ-
ence the future course of litigation.... [W]hatever is said on the floor of
the Senate about a bill is the view of the Senator who is saying it.
137 Cong. Rec. S 15325, (daily ed. Oct. 29,1991)(statement of Sen. Danforth). Any
judge who tries to make legislative history out of the free-for-all that takes place
on the floor of the Senate is a very dangerous grounds.
78. 137 Cong. Rec. S 15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
79. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
80. 137 Cong. Rec. H 9526 to 9531 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)(statement of Rep. Edwards).
81. It will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will
apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment.
Ordinarily, courts in such cases apply newly enacted procedures and
remedies to pending cases. 137 Cong. Rec. S 15485 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
1991)(Senator Kennedy).
82. 137 Cong. Rec. S 15483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)(Senator Danforth).
83. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
84. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
85. My review of Supreme Court case law supports my reading that in the
absence of an explicit provision to the contrary, no new legislation is ap-
plied retroactively. Rather new statutes are to be given prospective ap-
plication only, unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise, which we
have not done in this instance. Support for this proposition is derived
from Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemi-
cal Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1579 (1990), and the unanimous
opinion of the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1988), and the numerous cases cited by Justice Kennedy in
Bowen.... Our intention in drafting the effective date provision was to
adhere to the principle followed by the vast majority of supreme court
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Senator Dole in his memorandum only provides a couple of lines to
the issue of retroactivity, but provides what is possibly the only direct
statement on the issue. The memorandum reads, "[S]ection 402 spec-
ify [sic] that the Act and the amendments made by the Act... will not
apply to cases arising before the effective date of the Act."86 Senator
Dole cites Bowen,8 7 Kaiser8 8 and Bradley 9 but unlike the others fails
to discuss the rule preferred.
For all the discussion, we are left with the single statement by Sen-
ator Dole that the Act was not intended to perform retroactively. The
rest of the record merely is each Congressman's view of how decisions
should be determined by the courts. The result is a mish-mash of con-
flicting testimony attempting to describe the legislative intent. As
such, the record on this issue provides very little guidance except to
say, if the Congress had an intent, it was to create legislation with no
definite intent.
C. Plain Language of the Act
Section 402(a)-which gives the general effective date of the Act-
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and
the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enact-
ment."90 This section could logically be interpreted to apply the Act
"upon enactment" to all situations to which the Act could apply, both
in the future and past.
The district courts which have already discussed the issue of retro-
activity have used 402(a) both ways: To say the Act is retroactive and
to find against retroactivity. 91 Those courts believe 402(a) is persua-
sive, but the question is not when the Act "takes effect" or "begins"
but to what instances the Act applies. Section 402(a) is self explana-
tory. The Act comes into force immediately upon its passage, rather
than say, in July of 1992 or some other future date. There is no dis-
pute that most provisions of the Act take effect on the date of enact-
ment, November 21, 1991. The question is, as to what does the Act
take effect--completed acts, previously adjudicated cases, or only
those violations on and after November 21, 1991?
If Section 402(a) has value, it is to demonstrate the intent of Con-
gress to apply the Act prospectively. Section 402(a) would have been
cases and exemplified by Bowen and Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Bonjorno. 137 Cong. Rec. S 15483 (Daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)(statement of
Sen. Danforth).
86. 137 Cong. Rec. S 15953 (Daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991)(statement of Sen. Dole).
87. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
88. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
89. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
90. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1099.
91. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Khandelwal v.
Compuadd Co., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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the optimum position for Congress to provide retroactive application.
Instead, they provided for legislation to take effect on November 21,
1991, what would appear to be a prospective application from that date
forward.
Several other sections of the Act also relate to the effective date of
the Act. These sections apply to specific provisions on various issues:
1) Section 109, which relates to extending Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act overseas, "shall not apply with re-
spect to conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this Act."92
2) Section 110, which authorizes the establishment of a Technical
Assistance Training Institute, "shall take effect on the date of the en-
actment of this Act."93
3) Section 116, which preserves affirmative action programs
states: "[n]othing in the amendments made by this title shall be con-
strued to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or concilia-
tion agreements, that are in accordance with the law."94
4) Section 402(b), provides "[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact
case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for
which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983."95
Two of these sections do more than just provide an effective date
and also explicitly state to whom the section is to apply. The rest
merely provide a date for the section to "kick in." Section 109(c) is
one that details the section's scope.96 It provides that Section 109 ap-
plies to violating conduct that occurs on the day of the Act's enact-
ment and there after, all preenactment conduct is not subject to the
new provisions.
Likewise, 402(b) identifies a special disparate impact case to which
the Act does not apply.97 Courts have tried to read sections 109 and
402(b) with 402(a) to mean 402(a) applies to all pending cases. 98 For if
402(a) only applies to prospective cases, 402(b) and 109(c) essentially
are wholly unnecessary and mere surplusage. Such an argument does
92. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1078.
93. § 110(b), 105 Stat. at 1078.
94. § 116, 105 Stat. 1079.
95. § 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099.
96. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1077.
97. This exception is for the parties involved in Wards Cove Packing Coy. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989). Congress was just assuring that no further litigation would occur
in that case and was not attempting to create a retroactive statute. Section 402(b)
was added at the request of a Washington Senator who has seen Wards Cove
bounce around in the courts for 24 years and decided someday it ought to be
closed. Section 402(b) merely prevents the Wards Cove parties from attempting
any claims under the new Act so as to put that case to rest. See 137 Cong. Rec.
15953 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)(statement of Senator Dale).
98. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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not, however, create a clear indication that Congress intended a retro-
active statute.99
The argument that these sections would not have been included by
Congress if the Act was to apply prospectively is unpersuasive to prove
legislative intent. In fact, these provisions demonstrate that where
Congress wanted to decide the issue of retroactive application, it took
the initiative to state so specifically.100
Another provision of the Act appears to direct that the Title VII
changes do not apply to pending cases. Section 102(a)(1) of the Act
provides that only a "complaining party" may seek compensatory and
punitive damages and demand a jury trial under Title VII.101 Section
102(d) defines a "complaining party" as " the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may
bring an action under Title VII ... ."102 The definition suggests that
complaining party includes only "plaintiffs who have not yet brought
their actions are entitled to invoke the new Act."103
It is even more apparent that Congress knew how to create retroac-
tive legislation, when you look at the original bills of the Act. In 1990,
the Senate and House initiated a bill for the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
The Bill, accepted by Congress, and vetoed by President Bush, specifi-
cally provided for retroactive application back until 1989.104 Then, in
the altered 1991 version, structured to meet the President's demands,
those provisions creating retroactive application were removed. They
were replaced with 402(a), which does not provide for retroactive ef-
fect like the 1990 Bill, but to take effect at the time of the Act's
passage.
Additionally, the 1990 version would have applied to proceedings
that were "still pending." The 1991 Act dropped the language which
would apply the Act to pending cases. Such deliberate cutting and
change occurred for a purpose, and those close to the process point out
that the purpose was to create exclusive prospective legislation.
IV. CONCLUSION-THE ACT AND ITS NONRETROACTIVE
EFFECT
Whenever a case addressing the retroactive issue finally comes to
rest at the Supreme Court, it is the author's opinion that we will see
two major legal questions resolved. First, we will see the Court con-
tinue where it left off in Kaiser and put an end to the Bradley pre-
99. Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992); VanMeter v.
Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.C. 1991).
100. Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1992).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)(West Supp. 1992).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1)(West Supp. 1992).
103. VanMeter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D.C. 1992).
104. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 15 (1990). H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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sumption. And second, we will see the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied
under the basic context of a presumption against retroactivity as it has
been applied for close to 200 years.
As such, the 1991 Civil Rights Act is not retroactive legislation.
The Act is not explicit in its prospective application, but in the same
breath does not specifically apply retroactively. Thus, with the extinc-
tion of the Thorpe-Bradley presumption, the rule is clear: Legislation
must provide specific intent to apply retroactively. Any neutral or un-
clear legislation such as the Act is automatically applied prospectively
only.
